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1981] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
dent Investor Court's conclusion that dissolution should not pre-
clude the institution and prosecution of a derivative suit is
consistent with the literal requirements of section 626(b) and, in-
deed, is necessary in order to provide a remedy for minority share-
holders aggrieved by the misconduct of those persons exercising
corporate control.
John F. Finnegan
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW
General admonition to jointly represented defendants sufficient
to discharge trial court's duty of inquiry
Joint representation of criminal defendants is highly suspect
because the frequent inability of one attorney to protect the con-
flicting interests of codefendants156 is likely to give rise to the inef-
fective assistance of counsel.157 Although the sixth amendment
however, the appellate division intimated that a direct fiduciary duty was owing to the
stockholder from the corporate directors, and, therefore, the shareholder had recourse to a
remedy, either a representative or an individual action. 66 App. Div. 2d at 393, 412 N.Y.S.2d
at 899. The court, however, did not detail the nature of this fidiciary duty. Id. at 393, 412
N.Y.S.2d at 901. But see note 154 supra.
To hold that a corporate dissolution would have the effect of vitiating a shareholder's
derivative action, thereby leaving the shareholder remediless, see note 154 supra, could in-
duce dishonest corporate directors to arrange for a dissolution and distribution of assets,
thereby preventing action against themselves. Holmes v. Camp, 186 App. Div. 675, 679, 175
N.Y.S. 349, 352 (1st Dep't), a/I'd, 227 N.Y. 635, 126 N.E. 910 (1919). See generally note 124
supra.
1' For a discussion of the types of conflict involved in joint representation of multiple
defendants, see Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Inter-
est and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REV. 119,
125-35 (1978); Girgenti, Problems of Joint Representation of Defendants in a Criminal
Case, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 55, 61-67 (1979); Judd, Conflicts of Interest-A Trial Judge's
Notes, 44 FORDHAM L. Rlv. 1097, 1099-1107 (1976); Lowenthal, Joint Representation in
Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 64 VA. L. REv. 939, 941-50 (1978). Typically, claims of
conflict allege either counsel's failure to act in favor of one defendant in fear of implicating
the other, see, e.g., People v. Coleman, 42 N.Y.2d 500, 369 N.E.2d 742, 399 N.Y.S.2d 185
(1977), or taking of affirmative steps by counsel which inure to the benefit of one client
while severely damaging the case of the other. See People v. Dell, 60 App. Div. 2d 18, 400
N.Y.S.2d 236 (4th Dep't 1977). Additionally, many defenses at trial may be lost due to coun-
sel's attempt to minimize the existence of conflict. See Geer, supra, at 125-28.
157 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978); People v. Gomberg, 38
N.Y.2d 307, 312, 342 N.E.2d 550, 553, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769, 773 (1975); Geer, supra note 156, at
121; Lowenthal, supra note 156, at 939.
The right to the effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed to criminal defendants.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; CPL § 210.15(2) (1971). While it is the duty
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:368
does not require a trial judge to inquire into the propriety of joint
representation absent knowledge of a particular conflict of inter-
est,158 the New York courts have taken a stricter approach. Specifi-
cally, it is firmly established in New York that a trial court must
ensure, on the record, that each defendant is aware of the risks of
joint representation and that the decision to proceed is made
knowingly. 15 The requisite scope of the Court's appraisal, how-
of the trial court to protect a defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel, Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942), this right may be waived. United States v. Armedo-
Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 592 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam). The waiver of such a fundamental
right, however, must be scrutinized to assure that it is made knowingly and intelligently.
See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948); Lowenthal, supra note 156, at 969.
'58 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). In Cuyler, the Supreme Court stated: "Ab-
sent special circumstances, . . . trial courts may assume either that multiple representation
entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as
may exist." Id. at 346-47. The Court further stated that "[u]nless the trial court knows or
reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an in-
quiry." Id. at 347. The Cuyler dissent, however, contended that the trial judge should play a
more active role and, at the very least, should advise the defendants that "joint representa-
tion creates potential hazards which the defendants should consider before proceeding
." Id. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Prior to the Cuyler decision, there had been considerable disagreement within the fed-
eral courts concerning the duty of a trial judge in joint representation situations. See Com-
ment, Conflict of Interests in Multiple Representation of Criminal Co-Defendants, 68 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226, 241 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Conflict of Interests]. Com-
pare United States v. Waldman, 579 F.2d 649, 651-52 (1st Cir. 1978) (trial judge must in-
form of potential risks and make inquiries of defendants) and United States v. Carrigan,
543 F.2d 1053, 1055 (2d Cir. 1976) (trial judge must state facts underlying potential conflicts
and grant defendants a chance to present their views) and Campbell v. United States, 352
F.2d 359, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (trial judge must inquire to determine if decision is in-
formed and "not governed by poverty and lack of information on the availability of assigned
counsel") with United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1049 (1976) (defendants' rights are adequately protected by counsel's duty to inform
his clients of potential dangers) and United States v. Boudreaux, 502 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir.
1974) (court must inform defendant of risks only when it has specific knowledge that effec-
tive assistance of counsel may be impaired) and United States v. Christopher, 488 F.2d 849
(9th Cir. 1973) (no inquiry required). The American Bar Association, however, has recom-
mended an affirmative inquiry approach, stating:
Whenever two or more defendants who have been jointly charged, or whose
cases have been consolidated, are represented by the same attorney, the trial
judge should inquire into potential conflcits which may jeopardize the right of
each defendant to the fidelity of his counsel.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE FUNCTION OF
THE TRIAL JUDGE § 3.4(b) (Draft 1972). For a more comprehensive discussion of the varying
approaches adopted in the federal courts, see Girgenti, supra note 156, at 58 n.7, 67-72;
Hyman, Joint Representation of Multiple Defendants in a Criminal Trial: The Court's
Headache, 5 HOPsTRA L. REV. 315, 317-24 (1977); Lowenthal, supra note 156, at 970 &
nn.101-102; Conflict of Interests, supra, at 227, 241-47.
"' See, e.g., People v. Baffi, 49 N.Y.2d 820, 404 N.E.2d 737, 427 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1980);
People v. Ortiz, 49 N.Y.2d 718, 402 N.E.2d 139, 425 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1980); People v. Macer-
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ever, has been unclear.160 Recently, in People v. Lloyd, e16  the Court
of Appeals held that the trial court's duty of inquiry was satisfied
when the defendants and their attorney, in response to the court's
warning against the potential dangers of joint representation, gave
assurances that the defendants' waiver of the right to separate
counsel was made knowingly. 62
In Lloyd, the defendant and his codefendant were represented
by the same attorney in a joint trial for assault and attempted
murder.16 3 Prior to the trial, the court informed both defendants
and their attorney that there was a possible conflict of interest be-
ola, 47 N.Y.2d 257, 391 N.E.2d 990, 417 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1979); People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d
307, 342 N.E.2d 550, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975); People v. Hallett, 71 App. Div. 2d 815, 419
N.Y.S.2d 397 (4th Dep't 1979); People v. Caruso, 68 App. Div. 2d 570, 417 N.Y.S.2d 986 (2d
Dep't 1979). In People v. Gomberg, three defendants who were charged with arson were
represented by the same attorney. 38 N.Y.2d at 310-11, 342 N.E.2d at 552, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
772-73. Although the trial judge informed the defendants that a possible conflict might exist
and that they could retain separate counsel, the defendants chose to continue with the same
attorney. Id. at 314-16, 342 N.E.2d at 555, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 776-77. At trial, all of the defen-
dants sought to discredit the testimony of the state's witnesses, but one of them asserted the
additional defense of lack of motive. Id. at 310-11, 342 N.E.2d at 552, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
The latter defendant was acquitted, but the other two defendants were convicted. Id. at 311,
342 N.E.2d at 552, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 772. On appeal, the defendants claimed that they were
denied the effective assistance of counsel on the grounds that the acquitted defendant's lack
of motive defense shifted the blame to them, that counsel failed to call witnesses in their
behalf, and that counsel did not effectively cross-examine the other defendants. Id. at 311,
342 N.E.2d at 552, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 773. The Gomberg Court noted initially that a trial
judge must protect the defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel, but should
not lightly interfere with a defendant's selection of counsel. Id. at 312-13, 342 N.E.2d at 553,
379 N.Y.S.2d at 774. The Court emphasized that a defendant might not comprehend fully
that a conflict exists and, thus, the court should be satisfied that any decision to proceed
with selected counsel was an informed choice. Id. at 313, 342 N.E.2d at 554, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
774. The Court further stated that an inquiry may be directed toward counsel to determine
whether he has perceived a conflict and has informed his client of the dangers involved. Id.;
accord, Lord v. District of Columbia, 235 A.2d 322, 323 (D.C. 1967). The Gomberg Court
stated, however, that a trial court may place great reliance upon counsel's representations
that he has fully explained the dangers to his clients and has received their approval to
continue as counsel. 38 N.Y.2d at 314, 342 N.E.2d at 555, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 775. Based on this
reasoning, the Gomberg Court held that the trial judge's inquiry was more than adequate to
protect the defendants' rights to the effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 314-16, 342
N.E.2d at 555, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 776-77.
160 Compare People v. Ortiz, 49 N.Y.2d 718, 402 N.E.2d 139, 425 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1980)
and People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 342 N.E.2d 550, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975) with Peo-
ple v. Baffi, 49 N.Y.2d 820, 404 N.E.2d 737, 427 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1980) and People v. Macer-
ola, 47 N.Y.2d 257, 391 N.E.2d 990, 417 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1979).
161 51 N.Y.2d 107, 412 N.E.2d 371, 432 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1980), affg 70 App. Div. 2d 625,
415 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (2d Dep't 1979) (mem.).
162 51 N.Y.2d at 111, 412 N.E.2d at 373-74, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
263 Id. at 110, 412 N.E.2d at 372, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 686. The defendant and codefendant
were brothers. Id.
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cause the defendant was at the scene at all times while the code-
fendant arrived later." In response, the defendants acknowledged
their understanding of the possible conflicts and elected to retain
the same attorney.6 5 Following jury selection, the court repeated
its inquiry and informed the defendants of their right to separate
counsel. 6 In addition to receiving the defendants' consent to joint
representation, the court was assured by defense counsel that the
potential conflicts of interest had been discussed with his clients. 67
At the trial, the prosecution submitted evidence that the two de-
fendants had inflicted a severe beating upon another man.6 8 While
the defendant had been present on the scene from the outset of
the incident, there was conflicting evidence concerning the involve-
ment of the codefendant who had arrived at the scene when the
fight was nearly over.169 Subsequently, the defendant was con-
victed of assault while the codefendant was acquitted.17 0 The de-
fendant appealed, claiming that the pretrial inquiry by the trial
court did not sufficiently ensure that his waiver of the right to sep-
arate counsel was made knowingly and intelligently.' 17 The Appel-
late Division, Second Department, affirmed the assault con-
viction. 7 12
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court's in-
quiry was sufficient to protect the defendant's right to effective as-
sistance of counsel. 73 Writing for a divided Court,174 Judge Wach-
tler initially observed that in cases of multiple representation, the
trial judge's duty to warn the defendants of potential conflicts of
interest is independent of the attorney's obligation to warn his cli-
164 Id.
Id. at 110, 412 N.E.2d at 373, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
lee Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. The incident which culminated in the arrests of the defendant and his codefend-
ant allegedly began when the defendant followed a young woman who refused to accept a
ride with him. An acquaintance of the woman attempted to drive her home, but they were
followed by the defendant. Id. When both cars stopped at a traffic light, the defendant got
out of his car carrying either a stick or a bat, and an altercation ensued. Id. The codefend-
ant then arrived upon the scene and allegedly joined in the beating. Id.
170 Id. at 110-11, 412 N.E.2d at 373, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
171 70 App. Div. 2d at 625, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 1017.
172 Id.
171 51 N.Y.2d at 112, 412 N.E.2d at 374, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
174 The majority consisted of Judges Wachtler, Jasen, Gabrielli, and Chief Judge Cooke.
Judge Jones wrote a dissenting opinion in which Judges Fuchsberg and Meyer concurred.
[Vol. 55:368
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ents.17 5 The majority reasoned, however, that the judge's warning
need not be as thorough as the attorney's, since the court may not
be cognizant of the evidence to be presented 76 and, more impor-
tantly, may not inquire into confidential attorney-client communi-
cations.17 The Lloyd Court stated, therefore, that the trial court's
obligation is fulfilled when it warns the defendant that a conflict of
interest might arise from the joint representation, informs the de-
fendant that he has a right to separate counsel, and receives the
defendant's assurance that he wishes to proceed with the joint rep-
resentation.7 8 Judge Wachtler noted, however, that the precise
format of the inquiry necessarily involves judicial discretion be-
cause of the restrictions on the court imposed by the attorney-cli-
ent privilege and the desire not to disclose defense strategies.179
Dissenting, Judge Jones maintained that the obligation of the
trial court extends beyond establishing that each defendant is
aware of the possibility of a conflict of interest. 80 In the dissent's
view, the court must further ensure that the defendants were cog-
nizant of the specific risks inherent in a joint representation situa-
tion.' 81 Judge Jones emphasized that the court should "explain the
particulars or potential pitfalls of joint representation" necessary
175 51 N.Y.2d at 111, 412 N.E.2d at 373, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 686. Judge Wachtler noted
that in New York, the trial judge has the independent duty to ensure that the codefendants
are "aware of the potential risks involved in joint representation." Id.; see People v. Macer-
ola, 47 N.Y.2d 257, 263, 391 N.E.2d 990, 992-93, 417 N.Y.S.2d 908, 910 (1979); People v.
Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 313-14, 342 N.E.2d 550, 554, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769, 775 (1975). But cf.
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-48 (1980) (ordinarily federal district court has no obli-
gation to warn of the risks of multiple representation). A defense attorney representing mul-
tiple defendants also has an ethical obligation to explain potential conflicts to his clients
and to procure their consent to continued representation. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPoNsmmrrY, EC 5-16, DR 5-101(A), DR 5-105(B), (C); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.5(A), (B) (1974).
178 51 N.Y.2d at 111, 412 N.E.2d at 373, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 686-87; see People v. Gomberg,
38 N.Y.2d 307, 314, 342 N.E.2d 550, 554, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769, 775 (1975); Geer, supra note
156, at 141-42; Girgenti, supra note 156, at 58-59 n.7; Lowenthal, supra note 156, at 970-71.
177 51 N.Y.2d at 111, 412 N.E.2d at 373, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 687; see People v. Gomberg, 38
N.Y.2d 307, 313, 342 N.E.2d 550, 554, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769, 775; Geer, supra note 156, at 128.
178 51 N.Y.2d at 111, 412 N.E.2d at 373-74, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
279 Id. at 112, 412 N.E.2d at 374, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
180 Id. at 113, 412 N.E.2d at 374, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (Jones, J., dissenting). Judge
Jones opined that the Court had determined previously that the obligation of the trial court
extended beyond establishing an awareness of a possibility of a conflict to establishing an
awareness of each defendant "'of the potential risks inherent in the simultaneous represen-
tation of codefendants."' Id. (Jones, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d
257, 262, 391 N.E.2d 990, 992, 417 N.Y.S.2d 908, 910 (1979)).
181 51 N.Y.2d at 113, 412 N.E.2d at 374, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (Jones, J., dissenting).
1981]
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to a determination that an informed decision had been made.18 2
Judge Jones reasoned that while there may be no intrusion into
confidential communications, the protection afforded by the attor-
ney-client privilege should not be used to justify a limited inquiry
unless such inquiry is specifically opposed by the defendant.18 3
Finding the trial judge's inquiry insufficient, the dissent concluded
that a reversal was warranted since a significant possibility of
prejudice to the defendant had been shown.18 4
Although the standard articulated by the Lloyd Court is con-
sistent with recent cases in this area,-8 ' the decision is indicative of
182 Id. (Jones, J., dissenting). Relying on People v. Baffi, 49 N.Y.2d 820, 404 N.E.2d 737,
427 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1980), wherein the Court declared that the trial judge had a duty "to
probe the defendants' awareness of the risks," id. at 822, 404 N.E.2d at 738, 427 N.Y.S.2d at
616, the dissent observed that the statements by counsel that he had notified his clients of
the potential conflicts and had procured their consent to continued representation did not
relieve the court of its independent duty of inquiry. 51 N.Y.2d at 113, 412 N.E.2d at 375,
432 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (Jones, J., dissenting). The dissent further noted that although the trial
court had alerted the defendants to the fact that a possible conflict might exist, "there could
be no assurance that the details of the potential risks involved had been described to them
or that they had each made an informed decision to proceed with a single attorney." Id. at
113, 412 N.E.2d at 375, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (Jones, J., dissenting). For example, the dissent
indicated that the defendants' counsel may not have comprehended fully that the defen-
dants had a right to separate counsel since he considered that having his father-partner
represent one of the defendants was an acceptable alternative. Id.
183 51 N.Y.2d at 114, 412 N.E.2d at 375, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (Jones, J., dissenting). The
Lloyd dissent declared that although the trial judge should remain sensitive to possible in-
trusion upon attorney-client confidentiality, the judge should not be precluded from making
a thorough inquiry, since the defendant may assert his attorney-client privilege if he feels
that his other rights are adequately protected. Id. at 114, 412 N.E.2d at 375, 432 N.Y.S.2d at
688-89 (Jones, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 114-15, 412 N.E.2d at 375-76, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 689 (Jones, J., dissenting).
188 See, e.g., People v. Baffi, 49 N.Y.2d 820, 404 N.E.2d 737, 427 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1980);
People v. Ortiz, 49 N.Y.2d 718, 402 N.E.2d 139, 425 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1980); People v. Macer-
ola, 47 N.Y.2d 257, 391 N.E.2d 990, 417 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1979), discussed in The Survey, 54
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 428 (1980); People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 342 N.E.2d 550, 379
N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975). In Baffi, the trial court did not independently examine the defendants
as to whether they understood that conflicts of interest might arise from joint representa-
tion. Rather, the court merely relied upon the assurances made by the defense counsel. 49
N.Y.2d at 822, 404 N.E.2d at 738, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 616. The Court held that under these
circumstances the trial judge did not adequately discharge his duty of inquiry, stating that
"[a]lthough the trial court may place some reliance on the statement by counsel. . . such a
statement alone does not relieve the trial court of the obligation 'to probe the defendants'
awareness of the risks in the manner suggested . . . in Macerola." 49 N.Y.2d at 822, 404
N.E.2d at 738, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 616.
The scope of inquiry was not in issue in Macerola, however, since the trial court had
failed to make an inquiry. People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d at 264, 391 N.E.2d at 99, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 911. There is, nonetheless, language in the Macerola decision that suggests that
a more probing inquiry than the one sanctioned in Lloyd is necessary to discharge the
court's duty. Specifically, the Macerola Court stated:
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the inadequacy of such a limited judicial inquiry. The purpose of
the inquiry is to protect a defendant's constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel186 and, therefore, the waiver of sepa-
rate counsel should be scrutinized to ensure that it is made know-
ingly.18 7 The Lloyd Court, in failing to require the trial judge to
point out the specific deficiencies of joint representation essentially
permits a court to rely on the attorney's evaluation of the situation
as he related it to his clients.18 Although defense counsel must in-
form his clients of any possible conflicts of interest,189 the attorney
may not have perceived a conflict or evaluated it properly,190 and it
is unlikely that a defendant will discern a conflict which his attor-
While a defendant may choose to retain his attorney, such choice may be made
only after the defendant is informed of the possible ramifications which joint rep-
resentation might spawn when conflicting interests arguably exist. Only after suffi-
cient admonition by the trial court of the potential pitfalls of joint representation
can it be said that a defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel is
adequately safeguarded.
Id. at 263, 391 N.E.2d at 993, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 911. Any suggestion in Macerola that the trial
court must describe the potential pitfalls of joint representation was impliedly repudiated,
however, by the Court of Appeals in People v. Ortiz, 49 N.Y.2d 718, 402 N.E.2d 139, 425
N.Y.S.2d 801 (1980). In Ortiz, the Court held that the trial judge fulfilled his obligation
when he merely alerted the defendants to the possibility of a conflict of interest and in-
formed them of their right to separate counsel. Id. at 718-19, 402 N.E.2d at 140, 425
N.Y.S.2d at 801.
188 See note 157 supra.
'87 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 71 (1942); People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d 257, 262, 391 N.E.2d 990, 992, 417 N.Y.S.2d
908, 910 (1979); Geer, supra note 156, at 140; Lowenthal, supra note 156, at 969; accord,
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The
Von Moltke Court stated: "A judge can make certain that an accused's professed waiver of
counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive
examination of all the circumstances . . . ." Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. at 724.
18 Without the guidance of the trial court, the defendant has only the statement of
counsel to rely on. Since the defendant might be oblivious to any conflicts which his attor-
ney does not perceive, see note 190 and accompanying text infra, the defendant can indicate
his understanding of only those potential conflicts which his attorney has explained to him.
188 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrry, EC 5-16, DR 5-101(A), DR 5-
105(B), DR 5-105(C); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.5(B) (1974).
180 See, e.g., United States v. Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038, 1045 (7th Cir. 1976); People v.
Byrne, 17 N.Y.2d 209, 215, 217 N.E.2d 23, 25, 270 N.Y.S.2d 193, 196 (1966); Geer, supra
note 156, at 145; Lowenthal, supra note 156, at 970-71; The Survey, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
428, 433 (1980). In addition to failing to recognize a conflict or to evaluate it properly, coun-
sel may be unwilling to recognize or admit that conflicts exist due to economic interests. See
Geer, supra note 156, at 153; Girgenti, supra note 156, at 61 & n.15. Indeed, "the numerous
reported cases in which attorneys were wrong in their evaluation or unaware of the problem
are testimony to the need for judicial inquiry." Id. at 75-76.
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ney has not foreseen. 191 Thus, it is submitted that the general ad-
monition sanctioned by the Lloyd Court is insufficient to provide
the basis for an intelligent waiver of the right to separate
counsel.192
It is hoped that the Court will reconsider its holding in Lloyd
and adopt a standard which requires the trial judge to point out
the potential pitfalls of joint representation. 193 Although a defen-
dant might not fully comprehend the points raised,1 e4 this would
alert both counsel and client to consider the problem in greater
depth. Thus, the defendant would be better informed and more
capable of making an intelligent decision.195
Ray T. Blank, Jr.
Testimonial admissions do not preclude a party from the benefit
of more favorable, contradictory testimony by his adversary
It is well settled in New York that a formal admission of an
alleged fact made by a party in the pleadings or by stipulation in
court is conclusive upon that party and precludes him from offer-
ing or relying on contradictory evidence. 96 A fact admitted by a
"I See People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d 257, 263, 391 N.E.2d 990, 992, 417 N.Y.S.2d 908,
910 (1979); Lowenthal, supra note 156, at 971.
.2 See United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
998 (1977); Geer, supra note 156, at 140-41; Hyman, supra note 158, at 332.
193 It has been suggested that the trial court's inquiry should address why the defen-
dants and their attorney desire joint representation; whether potential conflicts have been
discussed; what defenses will be raised at trial; and whether the proposed defenses will pre-
sent conflicts. Girgenti, supra note 156, at 76. See also Conflict of Interests, supra note 158,
at 246.
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